INTRODUCTION
Unforesecable changed circumstances are probably one of the major problems partiesespecially those who are party to a long or langer 1erm complex contract -may face in international trade. Indeed, with globalisation these problems are increased as the involvement of more and more countries in production and procurement entails even greater imponderables. Natural disasters or changes of political and economic factors may considerably affect the very basis of the bargain. There may be an earthquake, a flood or a civil war in one of the production countries, forcing the producer 1o resort to countries with much higher production costs; import or export bans may hinder the envisaged flow of goods; or price fluctuations tliat were not foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract make the performance by the seller unduly burdensome or devaluate the con1ract performance for the buyer.
Tue paradigm of pacta sunt servanda or sanctity of contract simply places the burden of such a change of circumstances upon the party on which jt falls. However, since the old Roman days the 710 (2008) 39 VUWLR principle of impossibilium nul!a est obligatio, or there is no obligation to perform impossible things, 1 has been recogniscd. Things were simple at that time: the slave or the cattle that had been sold bad perished; or perhaps the crop that should be delivered was destroyed. Furthennore, under the doctrine of rebus sie stantibus 2 developed by the Roman praetor, 3 an unforeseeable and extmordinary change of circumstances rendering a contractual obligation extremely burdensome could be recognised. Since these days, impossibility ,force majeure or the like have become grounds for exemption in every legal system. 4 However, the question whether simple changes in the surrounding economic conditions may exempt the debtor from liability under thc contract has always been a hotly debated issue. 5 lt is to this very day. Let me first start with a short overview of how some domestic legal zystems treat this qucstion.
II

SOME DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS
Tue position ofFrcnch law represents one extreme and it is well documented. \Vhereas the rule forforce majeure is laid down in Article 1148 ofthe Code Civil (CC), neither general civil \aw nor commercial law has been favourable to the concept of hardship. 6 Tue famous theory of imprivision 7 that allows a contract tobe modified in case of a change of circumstances has been applied to administrative contracts only. 8 However, the Cour de Cassation has apparently moved Dig 50.17.185.
2
The term rebus sie stantibus was mentioned for the first time in the early 16th century In 1507, Jason de Mayno (1435-1519) suggested the use ofthe rebus sie stantibus doctrine as a general principle in contract law. For further details on this matter see Ralf Köbler Die "clausula rebus sie stantibus" als allgemeiner Rechtsgrwuisatz (JCB Mohr, Tübingen, 1991) 30-31.
The idea of adapting agreements and promises to an unforesecable and extraordinary change has its roots in roman philosophy with Cicero and Seneca. The doctrine found its way into the Canon law in the 14'h century, referring to it as rebus sie se habentibus. For further details see Köbler, above n 2, 28. away slightly from the strict pacta sunt servanda principle; it appears tobe heading in the direction of cventually recognising some kind of hardship.9
Many continental legaj_ systems, however, accept the theory ofhardship, among them Gennany, 1be Netherlands, ltaly, Greece, Portugal, Austria as well as the Scandinavian countrics. 1 0 The most recent aclrnowledgemcnt by statute can be folUJd in Germany. The Statute on the Modemisation of the Law of Obligations in 2001 finally codified the right to have the contract adapted to the changed circumstances in section 313 ofthe Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). 11
English law seems to reject any notion of rclief for changed circumstances that do not amount to impossibility. 12 However, in casc of frustration of contract -that means where the contract is rendcred useless by thc changc of circumstances -an exception is granted to this general rule. 13 In the United States, thc Uniforn1 Commercial Code has enacted the general doctrine of impracticability. 14 9 See Philippe Malaurie and Laurent Aynes Droit Civil: Les obligations (3ed, Editions juridiques associi:es, Paris, 2007) 379-380, stating that the judge cannot alter the contract direct]y on his or her own unless the parties have agreed upon a clause de sazwegarde (hardship clause) or the law itself provides for the possibility of the judicial adjustrnent ofthe contract. However, the judge is entitled to apply the principle of good faith according to Articlc 1134(3) CC ifthere is a severe inequity and one party is acting in bad faith. See also Kessedjian, above n 6,425. Today, however, it is more or less unanimously accepted in court and arbitral decisions, 23 as well as in scholarly writing,2 4 that Article 79 does indeed cover issues relating to hardship. Accordingly, first and foremost, there is no room to resort to domestic concepts ofhardship 25 as there is no gap in the CISG regarding the debtor's invocation of economic impossibility and the adaptation of the contract to changed circumstances. If one were to hold otherwise, unification of the law of sales would be undermined in a very important area. Domestic concepts such as frustration ofpurpose, rebus sie stantibus, fundamental mistake or Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage would all have to be considered.
However, which cases of hardship amount to an impediment under Article 79 and what remedies the aggrieved party may resort to are still matters of dispute.
IV PREREQUISITES FOR FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER THE CISG A General
Article 79(1) provides that a party is exempted from liability for damages only ifthe failure to perform is due, first, to an impediment beyond its control and, second, that it could not reasonably However, the latter gives a list of events that may amount to an impediment, such as war, natural disasters, explosions, strikes, acts of authority. Thus, conccming the issue offorce majeure, there are three clearly distinct prerequisites: the impediment must not fall in the sphcre of risk of the obligor; it must have been unforeseeable; and, it or its consequences must have been unavoidable.
27
As fär as the provisions regarding hardship are conccmed, again the international solutions bear great resemblance to one another. 28 In the first place, the relevant articles and clauses emphasise the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 29 Tue mere fact that perfonnance has been rendered more onerous than could reasonably have been anticipated at the time of the conclusion of the contract does not exempt the obligor from perfonning the contract. In an international market, one may expect the potentially aggrieved party to insist on incorporating terrns for a possible adjustment in the contract or otherwise assuming the risk for higher fluctuations than usually occur on domestic markets. Thus, the margin certainly has to be set at a higher point. A 150-200 per cent margin seems tobe advisable.
C Time Factor
In cases offorce majew·e, it is more or Jess unanimously held that it is irrelevant whether the impediment arose after the conclusion of the contract or if it already existed at the time of conclusion. 45 Thus, if the goods sold had already been destroyed at the time of the conclusion of thc contract, but the seller did not know about nor could have prevented this fact, the seller may be exempted under Article 79(1) ofthe CISG. 4 6 In cases of hardship, however, it is argued that the changed circumstances must have occurred after the conclusion of the contract. 47 This is the position taken by domestic legal systems. 48 Similarly, the wording of Article 6:111(1) of the PECL 1999 49 is clearly based upon this assumption. The related Comment affnms this position. 50 tbe conclusion of the contract as well as a gross disparity of the value of performances alrcady existing at thc time of conclusion ofthe contract
D Events that Could not Reasonably be Taken into Account or Avoided or Overcome
.FOrce majeure as well as hardship can only exempt the aggrieved party from liability if the cvents causing the impediment could not reasonably be taken into account by the aggrieved party at the time of the conclusion of the contract 57 If they could have been taken into account by the aggrieved party, then it can be expected that this party would insist on incorporating a specific contract clause to deal with the prob lern. Thus, this party must be assumed to have taken the risk. 58 Furthermore, even an impediment that the aggrieved party could not foresee at the time of the conclusion of the contract does not exempt it if overcoming the impediment is both possible and reasonable. 59 \Vhether the obligor can be expected to overcome the impediment has to be decidcd by taking thc above mentioned threshold for hardship into account. 60 Thus, for exan1ple, the scller must turn to another supplier or considcr alternative possibilities for the transportation ofthc goods if the increase in costs does not excced the relevant thrcshold.
V CONSEQUENCES OF FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP
A Exemption from Liabi/ity
If thc non-performance is due to an impediment that fulfüs the conditions set forth in Article 79(1) of the CISG or comparable provisions, 61 first and foremost, the obligor is relieved from its obligation to pay damages. 62 This includes so-called "liquidated damages" 63 as well as penalties (if they are at all valid under the governing domestic Jaw), unless the parties havc providcd othcrwise in their coniract. 64 Article 8:101(2) of thc PECL 1999 clearly states that where a party's non-performance is excused, alongside v.rith the right to claitn damages, the right to performance is likewise excluded. 65 \Vhether the exemption under Article 79 of the CISG also extends to the promisee's right of perfonnance has been a subject of considerable debate 66 becausc of the somewhat misleading wording of Article 79(5). 67 lt should be noted that, at the Vienna Conference, a Gcrman proposal that the wording should make it clear that if the impediment were a continuing one performance could not be insisted on was rejected. Jt was held that, in the case of actual impossibility, no problems would arise in practice whereas the categorical removal of the right to perfonnance could impair the promisee's accessory rights. 68 Although, especially among Gennan authors, there still remain doubts about the doctrinal justification, 69 nowadays it seems to be undisputed that, wherever the right to claiin performance would undermine the obligor's exemption, performance cannot be demandcd as long a<; the iinpediment exists. 70 This rule not only applies, for example, to cases of actual impossibility of performance, but also to cases ofhardship.
B Right of Avoidance
Among the rights that are not affected by an exemption is first and foremost the right to avoid the contract. 71 However, this right presupposes that the non-perfonnance amomrts to a fundamental breach of contract. \Vhether such a fundamental breach exists largely depends upon the circumstanccs of the individual case. 72 Article 25 74 Ibis duty to renegotiate is seen tobe based on a general duty to act in good faith 75 which is common to many civil law systems. 76 Other legal systems do not know such a duty to renegotiate. This is not only true for common law systems, even where they recognise the general principle of hardship or impracticability as section 2-615 of the UCC does, 77 but also some civil law systems such as Germany where, under the newly enacted section 313 of tbe BGB, the parties are not bound to renegotiate either. 78 Although there are some authors favouring such a duty to renegotiate under German law, 79 the prevailing view follows the clear wording of the provision that does not mention any such duty, but instead allows a party to immediately resort to the court asking for an adaptation of the contract. 80 Likewise, neither thc ltalian nor the Dutch Code provisions on hardship 8 1 obligc thc partics to renegotiate.
Article 79(5) ofthe CISG, as has already been pointed out, expressly relieves the affected party from damages only. Some authors, however, advocate the idca that under the CISG as wcll therc is a duty to renegotiate based upon Article 7(1) ofthe CISG, according to which thc Convention has to be interpreted with regard to the obscrvance of good faith in international trade. 82 lt has becn qucstioned many times whcthcr Article 7(1) may be applied not only in interpreting the Convention as such, but also in cstablishing the principle of dealing in good faith among the parties. 83 Without having to decide this dispute the question of any duty to rcncgotiatc can be answered in the negative.
In the first place, renegotiation -as negotiation -has to be based on willingness and trust. Constructive and cooperative renegotiation cannot be forced upon the parties by coercion. 84 Furthennore, Jacking any means of specific enforcement, the duty to renegotiate amounts to nothing more than a farce. The duty to negotiate would gain importance only if breaching it were sanctioned. Indeed, this is envisaged by Article 6:111(3)(c) of the PECL 1999. Accordingly, the court may award damages for the lass suffered through a party refusing to negotiate or breaking off negotiations contrary to good faith and fair dealing. Howevcr, it is certainly not advisable to state such a liability in damages. Cases ofhardship involve such complex fact situations and evaluations that it can hardly be determined whether a party refusing or breaking off negotiations acted in bad faith. In addition, international trade regularly calls for promptness and legal certainty, wbich militate against lengthy negotiations. Clear cases of bad faith may be taken into account upon allocating the costs of proceedings. 85 To sum up, in cases of hardship a duty to renegotiate should not be advocated. This, however, does not preclude that an offer by one party to adapt the contract to the changed circumstances becomes relevant when dealing with the possible respective remedies ofthe parties.
D Adaptation ofthe Contract andAvoidance
Under some civil law legal systems, in cases of hardsbip, thc court is primarily called upon to adapt the contract to the changed circumstances. 86 A voidance is allowed only as a remcdy of last resort if an adaptation of the contractual terms is either not possible or not just and reasonable having regard to the respective interests ofthe parties. 87 Und er thc first scenario, thc scllcr suggests delivering thc goods if the buyer is willing to pay a highcr purchase price. If the buycr consents, the contract is accordingly adaptcd. If the buycr docs not conscnt, and the seller repudiates the contract, bac;ed on its original terms, on the ground of hardship, the buyer in turn will sue the seller for specific performance or, most probably, for damages. The court or tribunal will then find that the seller is released from its obligations due to hardship. Ifthe seller wmlts to go through with the contract, albeit on different teJUls, it will initiate a counter-claim seeking perfomrnnce or damages for v,.,rongful repudiation on the part of the buyer.
The buyer will then rely on avoidance because of a fundamental breach. Now, the court or tribunal has to decide whether the fact that the seller was willing to deliver the goods, but on different teJUls, amounted to a fwidamental breach of contract giving the buyer the right to avoid the contract. Tue court here will have to consider whether it would have beenjust and reasonable for the buyer, in the circumstances of the given case, to accept the different tenns offered by the seller. If it finds that the buyer should have consented to an adaptation on the basis of good faith, it will find for the seller.
Tuming to the second scenario, the buyer offers to pay a high.er price whereas the seller wants to get out of the contract. Under these circumstances again, probably the buyer will claim either specific perfonnance or dmnages. The court or tribunal now has to detennine whether, having regard to the different contract terms offered by the buyer, hardship can still be held to ex.ist. If not, the seller is not released from its obligation to perform or to pay damages.
Thus, in both scenarios, results can be reached similar to those in legal systems that expressly provide for the power of the court or tribunal to adapt the contract to the changed conditions. Although this mechanism seems to be especially warranted in cases of hardship, it might also come into play in cases of other impediments under Article 79 ofthe CISG. Thus, where the seller has sold specific goods that were destroyed a:fter the formation of the contract, it may weil be the case that substitute goods exist, serving the buyer's interests just as weil aq the original ones. If the sellcr offers these goods as a "eure", the buycr may well be obliged to accept them as no fundan1cntal breach of contract can be ascertained in this case. lt has bcen shown, undcr the remedics mcchanism of the CJSG, that there is enough flexibility to reach just and equitable resultc;, on thc one hand, that guarantee legal certainty and, on the other hand, that contribute to implementing good faith and fafr dealing in international sales law. Thus, the very minimalism ofthe CISG on questions ofhardship facilitates solutions that are well adjusted to the everyday needs of globalised international trade.
VI CONCLUSION
92 Ibid, 470-486.
